Why Government Cannot Define Religious Exercise

Reflections on Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission

The American constitutional order begins with the first principle that civil government may exercise only limited power. Among the most important of those limits is that government holds no authority to define authentic religious belief or determine how citizens must express their faith. Such belong to God, and to the religious communities that seek to obey Him. Whenever the State assumes the role of theologian, it exceeds the authority entrusted to it by the Constitution.

The Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that permanent principle in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission. Although the dispute arose from Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation law, the constitutional question reached much deeper. Could government distinguish between ministries it considered sufficiently “religious” and those it regarded as simply charitable? The Court correctly answered that it could not.

Catholic Charities Bureau serves as the charitable ministry of the Diocese of Superior in Wisconsin. Consistent with centuries of Christian teaching, it aided persons with disabilities, the elderly, and others in need -- without regard to their religious affiliation. Its ministry reflected Christ’s command to love one’s neighbor and care for “the least of these.” It served because Christians understand such acts of mercy as an expression of obedient faith.

Wisconsin law exempted certain religious organizations from participation in the state’s unemployment insurance system. State officials concluded, however, that Catholic Charities did not qualify, deeming its activities as not sufficiently religious. The State reasoned that the ministry served people of every faith rather than primarily Catholics and that it did not use its charitable work to proselytize or encourage religious conversion. In effect, Wisconsin concluded that genuine religious activity consists primarily of teaching doctrine or conducting worship rather than serving one’s neighbor. That conclusion, though, required government to answer a profoundly theological question.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor held that the First Amendment forbids government from preferring one religious understanding over another. The State of Wisconsin’s distinction favored those religious traditions that integrate evangelism directly into charitable work, while disadvantaging faiths that understand mercy itself to be a religious obligation. Such denominational discrimination cannot survive constitutional scrutiny because the Establishment Clause prohibits government from officially preferring one religious denomination (or one understanding of religious practice) over another. The Court therefore held that Wisconsin’s exemption, as applied, violated the Constitution. The significance of the decision extends far beyond unemployment taxes.

The Declaration of Independence teaches that human beings are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” and that governments exist to secure, not create, those rights. Among those pre-political rights is the free exercise of religion. The Founders understood religious duty to arise first from obligations owed to the Creator rather than from permissions granted by civil authority. James Madison articulated this principle with particular clarity in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. He argued that religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence,” because every person owes a duty to the Creator that is “precedent, both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.” Civil government therefore lacks competence not only to compel religious belief but also to determine what authentic religious exercise should look like.

That understanding shaped the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause restrains government from interfering in matters properly belonging to religious communities, while the Free Exercise Clause protects believers as they faithfully live according to conscience. Together they preserve institutional independence by preventing civil authorities from assuming responsibilities not entrusted to them.

The Wisconsin officials nevertheless attempted precisely what the Constitution forbids. By distinguishing between charitable work they regarded as sufficiently religious and charitable work they considered insufficiently religious, the State necessarily became an arbiter of theology. It evaluated competing understandings of Christian ministry and rewarded one while disadvantaging another. Such governmental inquiry is fundamentally inconsistent with both constitutional structure and judicial restraint.

The judiciary is charged with saying what the law is, not what authentic Christianity requires. Judges possess neither constitutional authority nor institutional competence to determine whether feeding the hungry is more or less religious than preaching a sermon, whether caring for the disabled is more or less spiritual than conducting public worship, or whether acts of mercy sufficiently proclaim the Gospel. Those questions belong to religious communities guided by Scripture and conscience, not to civil magistrates interpreting tax statutes.

Indeed, Scripture itself rejects the artificial distinction Wisconsin attempted to draw. Our Lord declared that whatever is done for “the least of these” is done unto Him. The Epistle of James teaches that faith without works is dead. Throughout Christian history, hospitals, orphanages, schools, rescue missions, and ministries to the poor were not viewed as secular enterprises. They were understood as outward expressions of religious conviction flowing from love of God and love of neighbor.

The implications of the Court’s decision are substantial. Faith-based schools, pregnancy resource centers, adoption agencies, homeless shelters, disaster relief organizations, ministries to refugees, and countless other religious institutions often serve every person in need regardless of creed. Their willingness to extend mercy universally does not diminish the religious character of their work. It often demonstrates its deepest theological commitments. The Constitution wisely leaves such judgments where they belong. Government may enforce neutral laws, protect public safety, and administer civil affairs. It may not decide that one form of religious obedience is more authentic than another.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, therefore, reaffirms a foundational principle of American constitutionalism. The civil magistrate holds no authority to define religion. In preserving that boundary, the Court protected not only Catholic Charities, but every house of worship, ministry, and religious organization whose faithful service reflects the diverse ways believers understand their duty to God. That is precisely the humility, and the constitutional fidelity, the First Amendment demands.