Michigan Proposal 1: A Constitutional Opportunity or a Constitutional Risk?

Michigan voters will decide this November whether to convene a constitutional convention to consider rewriting the state's Constitution. For citizens committed to the sanctity of human life, religious liberty, parental rights, and limited government, the question presents both an extraordinary opportunity and a substantial risk.

Proposal 1 appears on the ballot not because of a petition drive or legislative initiative, but because Michigan's Constitution expressly requires it. Article XII, Section 3, of the 1963 Constitution mandates that voters be asked every sixteen years, beginning in 1978, whether to convene a constitutional convention. Michigan voters rejected such conventions in 1978, 1994, and 2010. The last successful call for a convention came in 1961, producing the Constitution voters narrowly ratified in 1963. If Proposal 1 passes, Michigan voters will elect 148 delegates—one from each state House and Senate district—to consider revisions to the state's foundational governing document. Any proposed constitution or amendments approved by the convention must then be submitted to Michigan voters for ratification.

There is good reason to be dissatisfied with Michigan's current Constitution. The adoption of Proposal 3 in 2022, which established unfettered abortion as a fundamental constitutional right, represented a profound departure from the conviction that every human life possesses inherent dignity and that government exists to protect, rather than redefine, unalienable rights. From a Christian natural-law perspective, the amendment illustrates how constitutional language can be used not only to manufacture diabolical fundamental liberties but also to place deeply contested moral judgments beyond the reach of ordinary legislative deliberation.

A constitutional convention could provide an opportunity to correct such provisions, strengthen protections for religious conscience and parental authority, restore constitutional limits on governmental power, and reaffirm the foundational principles of ordered liberty.

But the opposite is equally possible.

Unlike a narrowly focused constitutional amendment, a convention could reconsider virtually every provision of Michigan's Constitution. Depending on who is elected as delegates, the resulting document could strengthen constitutional protections for life, liberty, and conscience—or further entrench abortion rights, expand governmental authority, and weaken protections for religious institutions, families, and individual freedom.

The political alignment surrounding Proposal 1 is unusual. Republican leaders, including House Speaker Matt Hall and Senate Minority Leader Aric Nesbitt, have expressed support for convening a constitutional convention. Meanwhile, opposition brings together organizations as diverse as the Michigan Democratic Party, Planned Parenthood Advocates of Michigan, the ACLU of Michigan, Citizens for Traditional Values, the Michigan Catholic Conference, and Right to Life of Michigan - all who oppose the proposal. Organized labor, conservative public policy organizations such as Americans for Prosperity–Michigan, and business organizations, including the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, have also joined the opposition. Their reasons may differ, but their shared position reflects the range of perspectives informing the debate over whether to convene a constitutional convention.

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mportantly, convention delegates could propose sweeping changes, but they could not impose them. The ultimate decision would remain with Michigan's voters, who must approve any proposed constitution or amendments before they can take effect.

The fundamental question, therefore, is not simply whether Michigan's Constitution needs improvement. It is whether opening the entire Constitution to revision creates a greater opportunity to restore foundational liberties than a risk of further eroding them.

Reasonable Christian citizens, including those who share a Christian understanding of human dignity and constitutional government, may reach different conclusions. Some will see a rare opportunity for constitutional restoration. Others will conclude that the uncertainty surrounding the convention's composition and eventual work counsels caution.

Both perspectives deserve serious consideration. Constitutional conventions can produce enduring safeguards for liberty. They can also institutionalize errors that prove exceedingly difficult to correct.

The stakes are substantial, and the outcome is anything but certain.