The Meaning of American Citizenship

A Commentary on the Citizenship Clause

Few constitutional questions are more fundamental than this: Who does the Constitution recognize as a member of the American political community?

That question lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. Barbara. Although much of the public discussion focused on immigration policy and border security, the Court confronted a far more lasting constitutional question. Beyond whether current immigration laws are wise, or whether Congress ought to adopt different border policies, the Court sought to discern the accurate meaning of the words, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as the Framer's penned them in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Those five words shaped American citizenship for more than a century and a half. They also illuminate a deeper constitutional truth. Before a republic can govern itself, it must know who constitutes the people from whom governmental authority is derived. Citizenship is a legal status that defines membership in the constitutional community itself. The Declaration of Independence provides the philosophical foundation for that understanding. It proclaims that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” Before a people can establish a government by consent, though, they must first exist as a distinct political community.The Constitution presupposes the existence of a political community before it creates the institutions that govern it. Accordingly, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment addresses one of the most basic questions in constitutional law: Who is a member of that community as a matter of constitutional law and jurisprudence? That is why Trump v. Barbara is about so much more than immigration. It asks where constitutional citizenship begins. Does it arise simply from the accident of birth within the Nation’s territorial boundaries? Or does it reflect a deeper legal and political relationship between the individual and the constitutional community?

Reasonable people answered those questions differently throughout our Nation’s history. Remarkably, so did the Justices of the Supreme Court. Every member of the Court agreed that the Constitution’s text governs. Every member looked to history, tradition, and precedent. Yet they reached fundamentally different conclusions because they disagreed about the historical meaning of a single constitutional phrase. Indeed, that is what makes this decision of the most significant originalist debates produced by the Supreme Court in recent years. The disagreement between the justices was not over whether history matters. The disagreement concerned which history governs the meaning of the Citizenship Clause.

Before considering the Court’s competing interpretations, however, it is important to understand how this constitutional question arrived before the Supreme Court in the first place.

The Story Behind the Case

Like many of the Supreme Court’s most consequential constitutional decisions, Trump v. Barbara began with a single governmental act that raised an enduring constitutional question.

Exercising his power pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, the President issued Executive Order 14160. That EO held no birht-right citizenship existed for babies born to parents unlawfully present in the United States at the time of the birth.The Executive Order rested on a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause that many regard as constitutionally legitimate. Under that interpretation, a person falls within the ambit of the Clause only if he or she is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the full constitutional sense. Children born to parents who entered the country unlawfully do not satisfy that requirement, the argument maintains, because their parents lack the complete political allegiance that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Clause to require.

The Executive Order immediately drew constitutional challenges from political activists working with several people who had illegally entered and were unlawfully present in the United States. They argued the President's EO conflicted with more than a century of an alternative constitutional understanding and Supreme Court precedent. A federal district court certified a nationwide class, issued a preliminary injunction, and prevented the Order from taking effect while the litigation proceeded. Because the controversy implicated one of the Nation’s most fundamental constitutional questions and affected thousands of children yet to be born, the Supreme Court granted review before the normal appellate process had run its course. 

Although public debate quickly shifted to immigration policy, the constitutional question before the Court remained much narrower. The Justices did not decide whether current immigration laws adequately protect the Nation's borders, whether Congress should strengthen border security, or whether lawmakers should revise the Nation's immigration statutes. Those policy judgments belong primarily to the political branches. The Court instead confronted a single constitutional question. What does the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause mean? Does the Clause guarantee American citizenship to every child born within the territorial boundaries of the United States, regardless of the immigration status of his or her parents? Or did the Framers intend the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” to require something more than mere birth on American soil? 

That distinction is critical. Constitutional interpretation begins not by asking what policy we prefer, but by asking what law the Constitution actually adopted. The Supreme Court was not writing a new immigration policy. It was attempting to determine the original meaning of constitutional language ratified more than 150 years ago.

The Court ultimately answered that question in the affirmative, concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees birthright citizenship to children born in the United States regardless of their parents’ immigration status. Yet the significance of the decision lies not merely in its holding, but in the competing constitutional histories offered by the majority and the dissent. Every Justice agreed that constitutional text, history, and original meaning controlled the analysis. Their disagreement arose because they understood the history of the Citizenship Clause differently.

To appreciate that debate, we must begin where the Court began—with the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.

The Five Words at Issue

Constitutional interpretation often turns on a single word or phrase. In Trump v. Barbara, it turned on five.

The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

The parties agreed on almost everything contained in that sentence. They agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment governs citizenship. They agreed that birth within the United States is an essential requirement. They agreed that the Citizenship Clause repudiated the Supreme Court’s infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had wrongly denied citizenship to African Americans. They even agreed that constitutional interpretation must begin with the text and be informed by history, (something I've said for over forty years).

Their disagreement centered entirely on five words: “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” What did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment mean by that phrase?

At first glance, the answer may appear obvious. Every person physically present within the United States must obey American law. Visitors may be arrested for committing crimes. They may be sued in American courts. They are protected by American law while they remain within our borders. In that contemporary ordinary sense, they are unquestionably subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Constitutional interpretation, however, requires us to ask a more careful question. Did the Framers use the word jurisdiction in this ordinary territorial sense, or did they employ it as a legal term of art reflecting a deeper political relationship between the individual and the Nation? That single interpretive question produced one of the Court’s most significant constitutional debates in recent memory.

Competing Visions of Constitutional Citizenship

At first glance, the opinions in Trump v. Barbara appear to reach opposite conclusions about the Citizenship Clause. At a deeper level, however, they reveal something far more interesting. Both the majority and the dissent accepted the same method of constitutional interpretation. Both looked first to the constitutional text, both sought its original public meaning, and both relied extensively upon history. Their disagreement arose because they began with different historical premises and therefore told different constitutional stories.

Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis with the English common law. His opinion traces the doctrine of birthright citizenship to Calvin’s Case (1608), where English courts embraced the principle of jus soli—the “right of the soil.” Under that doctrine, birth within the sovereign’s dominion ordinarily established political membership. The relationship was reciprocal. The sovereign owed protection to those born under his authority, and those born under that protection owed allegiance to the sovereign. With only narrow historical exceptions, birthplace—not the citizenship of one’s parents—determined one’s status. 

According to the majority, that common-law understanding crossed the Atlantic with the American colonies and continued after Independence. The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, did not invent birthright citizenship. It constitutionalized an existing legal principle already deeply embedded in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Roberts repeatedly emphasized Senator Jacob Howard’s statement during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that the Citizenship Clause was “simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already.” In the majority’s view, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted the traditional rule rather than creating a new one. 

Justice Thomas viewed the same history through a different constitutional lens. He agreed that history controls. He agreed that Dred Scott was wrongly decided. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally reshaped American citizenship after the Civil War. Yet he rejected the majority’s premise that English common-law subjectship supplied the controlling constitutional framework. In his view, the American Revolution did more than separate the colonies from Great Britain. It transformed the very nature of political membership.

Americans were no longer subjects of a monarch. They had become citizens of a constitutional republic.

That distinction carries constitutional significance. A subject owes allegiance because of the authority of the Crown. A citizen belongs to a self-governing political community whose legitimacy rests upon the consent of the governed. Thomas therefore argued that the Citizenship Clause cannot simply be understood by importing English concepts of feudal allegiance into the Constitution of a republican people. Rather, citizenship requires the complete political allegiance that accompanies membership in the American constitutional order. Mere physical presence within the Nation’s borders, he argued, is not enough. 

The contrast between the two opinions illustrates an often overlooked important feature of constitutional interpretation. The disagreement was not between history and policy. It was between two competing historical narratives. The majority viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as preserving a settled common-law rule inherited from England and incorporated into American law. The dissent viewed the Amendment as reflecting a distinctly American understanding of republican citizenship that emerged after Independence and cannot be reduced to inherited English doctrines. That distinction is subtle, but it is profoundly important.

In many constitutional controversies, judges disagree because they begin with different philosophies of interpretation. Here, however, every Justice professed fidelity to original meaning. Their disagreement lay not in methodology but in historical judgment. Which legal tradition did the Framers understand themselves to be adopting? Did the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” incorporate the English common-law doctrine of jus soli, or did it embody a uniquely American conception of political allegiance forged by the Revolution and refined during Reconstruction? Reasonable constitutional scholars answered that question differently for decades. It is therefore unsurprising that the Court divided over it as well.

For me, one of the most significant lessons of Trump v. Barbara is not simply the Court’s holding, but the manner in which it reached it. At a time when constitutional interpretation is too often reduced to political preferences, this decision reminds us that serious constitutional adjudication requires something far more demanding. It requires judges to wrestle honestly with constitutional text, historical evidence, legal tradition, and precedent—even when those sources do not yield easy answers. That is precisely what occurred here. The result was not unanimity. It was something more valuable. While I believe the evidence supports that Justice Thomas's dissent more likely reached the correct answer than the Chief Justice's majority opinion, a careful constitutional conversation about the meaning of American citizenship occurred. Those kind of judicial conversations ought to continue to shape legal scholarship and judicial decision-making.

What the Court Actually Decided

One of the first responsibilities of constitutional commentary is to distinguish between what the Supreme Court decided and what many people assume it decided (including the press). The Court did not decide whether birthright citizenship represents wise public policy. It did not determine whether Congress should reform the Nation’s immigration laws. It did not resolve broader questions concerning border security, unlawful immigration, or the proper scope of executive authority over immigration enforcement. Those questions remain matters for the political branches and continue to be the subject of vigorous public debate.

Instead, the Court addressed a far narrower constitutional question: Does the Fourteenth Amendment itself guarantee American citizenship to every child born within the territorial boundaries of the United States, regardless of the immigration status of his or her parents? The majority answered that question in the affirmative. It concluded that children born in the United States are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States because they are born within the Nation’s territorial authority and therefore acquire citizenship at birth under the Citizenship Clause. 

Central to the Court’s analysis was its understanding of United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Chief Justice Roberts treated that decision as controlling constitutional precedent. According to the majority, Wong Kim Ark settled four propositions that governed the present case: first, that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the common-law principle of jus soli; second, that “jurisdiction” refers primarily to the sovereign’s governing authority within its territory; third, that lawful domicile is not a constitutional prerequisite to citizenship; and fourth, that the immigration status or citizenship of a child’s parents is not constitutionally determinative. Once those principles were accepted, the outcome of the case largely followed. 

The dissent viewed Wong Kim Ark differently. Justice Thomas did not argue that the decision should be ignored. Rather, he contended that it should not be extended beyond the circumstances actually presented there. In his view, (and mine) Wong Kim Ark addressed children born to parents lawfully domiciled in the United States, not children whose parents were present unlawfully or only temporarily. Consequently, Thomas maintained that the Court still had an obligation to determine the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause itself rather than assuming that Wong Kim Ark resolved every modern question concerning birthright citizenship. 

Whether one ultimately agrees with the majority (which I do not) or the dissent (which I do), the decision illustrates an enduring feature of constitutional adjudication. Constitutional precedent matters. Indeed, it promotes stability, predictability, and equal justice under law. Yet precedent must always be understood in light of the constitutional text from which it derives. That is why the majority devoted so much attention to history even while relying heavily on Wong Kim Ark. Likewise, it explains why the dissent sought to distinguish rather than disregard that important precedent. In my judgment, this is one of the cases’s greatest strengths. Neither the majority nor the dissent approached the Constitution as a blank slate upon which contemporary policy preferences could be written. Both recognized that the Court’s task was judicial rather than legislative. The question was never, What immigration policy would best serve the Nation today? The question was, What legal rule did the American people adopt when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment?

That distinction is essential to preserving the rule of law. Judges are not elected to enact new public policy. They are entrusted with saying what the law is. Whether one ultimately finds the majority’s historical account or the dissent’s more persuasive, the Court understood that its constitutional duty was to interpret the Citizenship Clause according to its original legal meaning—not according to the political preferences of the present generation.

That brings us to what may be the most enduring lesson of Trump v. Barbara. Beyond the immediate question of birthright citizenship, the case offers a revealing window into how originalism actually operates in constitutional adjudication. It demonstrates that fidelity to text and history is not a mechanical formula but a disciplined method of constitutional interpretation that demands both historical rigor and judicial humility.

What This Case Teaches About Originalism

One of the most remarkable features of Trump v. Barbara received surprisingly little attention in the public commentary that followed the Court’s decision. Virtually every Justice approached the case as an originalist.

That observation may surprise many readers. Originalism is often portrayed in popular debate as a sharply contested judicial philosophy embraced by some Justices and rejected by others. Yet in this case, no member of the Court suggested that the Constitution should be interpreted according to evolving social values or contemporary political preferences. No Justice argued that the Citizenship Clause should be rewritten to accommodate modern immigration policy. Instead, every opinion began where constitutional interpretation ought to begin, with the constitutional text itself. They then turned to history, tradition, and precedent to determine what that text meant when it became part of the Constitution. That alone is significant.

Too often, constitutional litigation devolves into arguments about the policy outcomes judges should reach. The judicial role, however, is fundamentally different. Judges are not legislators in robes. They are entrusted with a more modest, but no less important, responsibility: to say what law is that the people have already enacted. The Constitution is not a living repository of judicial preferences. It is the supreme law of the land, and its meaning must be derived from the text the American people ratified. Trump v. Barbara illustrates both the strength and the humility of that enterprise. The strength of originalism lies in its commitment to an objective source of constitutional authority. Rather than asking what the Constitution ought to say, originalism asks what it does say, understood according to its original public meaning. That approach recognizes that in a constitutional republic, the people—not judges—possess the authority to amend the Constitution. The judicial duty is therefore one of faithful interpretation rather than constitutional revision.

Yet the case also demonstrates the humility required of originalism. History is not always simple. Constitutional language often carries legal meaning shaped by centuries of legal development. Historical sources must be gathered, weighed, and interpreted. Honest scholars examining the same historical record may sometimes reach different conclusions. That is precisely what occurred here. Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Citizenship Clause incorporated the longstanding common-law principle of jus soli inherited from England and embraced in American law. Justice Thomas concluded that the American Revolution fundamentally altered the nature of political membership and that the Fourteenth Amendment reflected a distinctly republican understanding of citizenship grounded in political allegiance rather than inherited English subjectship. Both opinions were rooted in constitutional history. Both relied extensively on original sources. Their disagreement arose because they understood the historical evidence differently. That is not a weakness of originalism. It is evidence that constitutional interpretation is a serious intellectual discipline rather than a mechanical formula.

Lawyers often search for easy answers. Constitutional interpretation rarely provides them. The Constitution was written in words, and words must be understood in their historical and legal context. The work of judging therefore requires careful scholarship, disciplined reasoning, and the humility to recognize that history cannot simply be reduced to political or ideological preferences.

This case also reminds us that precedent and original meaning are not competing principles. Properly understood, they complement one another. Precedent promotes stability and continuity within the law. Original meaning anchors that precedent to the Constitution itself.

Perhaps the greatest lesson of Trump v. Barbara is that constitutional disagreement need not become constitutional relativism. Judges may disagree without abandoning the rule of law. They may interpret the same historical record differently while remaining united in their commitment to the Constitution as a legal text possessing an objective meaning independent of their personal preferences. That understanding has profound implications far beyond the Citizenship Clause. It reflects a larger truth about constitutional government. The legitimacy of judicial review depends not upon the wisdom of judges, but upon their fidelity to the Constitution they swear to uphold. Courts preserve public confidence not by reaching politically popular results, but by demonstrating that their decisions arise from law rather than will.

In an age increasingly tempted to view every constitutional controversy through the lens of partisan politics, Trump v. Barbara offers a refreshing reminder that constitutional adjudication is, at its best, an exercise in disciplined legal reasoning. The Court’s members disagreed vigorously, yet they shared a common conviction that constitutional meaning is found not in the changing winds of public opinion, but in the enduring text and history of the Constitution itself.

That may be the decision’s most enduring legacy. Regardless of where one stands on birthright citizenship, the case reaffirms an essential first principle of our constitutional order: the Constitution is not whatever judges wish it to become. It is a written charter of government whose meaning is discovered through careful attention to its text, its history, and the legal traditions from which it arose. In a nation committed to the rule of law, that is indispensable to the preservation of constitutional self-government.

A Christian Worldview Perspective and Constitutional Citizenship

The debate over birthright citizenship also invites reflection upon a question that lies beyond constitutional law itself: What does it mean to belong to a political community? The Constitution answers that question as a matter of civil law. Scripture addresses it from a different perspective. The two are related, but they are not identical.

The Bible teaches that every human being possesses inherent and equal dignity because every person is created in the image of God. That truth does not depend upon nationality, ethnicity, race, citizenship, or legal status. Human worth is not conferred by government. It is bestowed by the Creator. Long before the Constitution was written, Scripture declared that men and women bear God’s image and therefore deserve justice, respect, and the equal protection of the law. This distinction is critically important.

Citizenship is not the source of human dignity. Nor is it the measure of human value. An American citizen does not possess greater intrinsic worth than a lawful permanent resident, a visitor, or even one who has entered the country unlawfully. Before God, every human life is sacred. Every person is our neighbor. Every person is entitled to be treated with justice and compassion. Yet the Christian understanding of human dignity does not eliminate the legitimate role of civil government or the reality of political communities.

Scripture recognizes that God has ordained civil government to preserve order, punish wrongdoing, and promote justice. Throughout the biblical narrative, nations possess boundaries, governments exercise lawful authority, and rulers bear responsibility for those entrusted to their care. The Apostle Paul teaches that governing authorities are “ministers of God” charged with maintaining civil order. That responsibility necessarily includes defining the legal relationship between the political community and those who belong to it.

Here the Constitution and Scripture address different, though complementary, questions.

The Constitution asks, Who is a citizen of the United States?

Scripture asks, How should we treat every human being, regardless of citizenship?

Those questions should never be confused.

In recent years, public debate has often collapsed them into one. Some have assumed that questioning the scope of birthright citizenship necessarily diminishes the dignity of immigrants. Others have concluded that affirming the equal worth of every person requires ignoring the legal distinctions established by constitutional government. Neither conclusion follows.

A Christian worldview permits us, and indeed requires us, to hold two truths simultaneously.

First, every person bears the image of God and therefore possesses equal and inherent dignity.

Second, citizenship is a legal relationship established by a constitutional community for purposes of self-government. One proposition is theological. The other is constitutional.

Recognizing that distinction enables us to approach Trump v. Barbara with both conviction and humility. Christians of good faith may disagree about the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause while remaining united in their commitment to defend the dignity of every human person. Likewise, constitutional scholars may debate the historical meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” without reducing those with whom they disagree to political caricatures.

This distinction also reminds us of a broader truth about the American constitutional order. The Declaration of Independence grounds human equality in “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” and proclaims that all people “are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” Those rights belong to persons because they are human, not because they are citizens. Citizenship determines one’s legal relationship to a particular political community. It does not determine one’s humanity, one’s moral worth, or the obligations of justice owed to every person.

That understanding has profound implications for constitutional interpretation. The Fourteenth Amendment should not be read through the lens of contemporary political passions, nor should it be treated as a vehicle for resolving every policy dispute concerning immigration. Its purpose is more modest, but no less important. It establishes the constitutional rule by which the American people have defined citizenship. Whether one ultimately agrees with the majority or the dissent in Trump v. Barbara, the legal question remains a constitutional one, not a theological one.

A Christian worldview therefore encourages both fidelity and charity. Fidelity to the Constitution as the governing law of the Nation and charity toward every person as one created in the image of God. Those commitments are not in tension. Indeed, they reinforce one another. A just society requires both the rule of law and a proper understanding of the dignity of the human person.

That is perhaps the deepest lesson this case offers. Constitutional citizenship defines membership in the American political community. It does not define the value of the human person. The Constitution establishes our civic obligations to one another as citizens. Scripture reminds us of our higher obligation to love our neighbor, seek justice, and recognize the image of God in every member of the human family. When those truths remain properly ordered, both constitutional government and human dignity are strengthened.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The Supreme Court has spoken, but the national conversation should not end here.

Trump v. Barbara settles the question as a matter of current constitutional precedent. It does not, however, end the scholarly debate over the original public meaning of the Citizenship Clause. Indeed, I suspect the decision will inspire renewed historical research into Reconstruction, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and the original understanding of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Constitutional law advances not only through judicial opinions, but through the careful work of historians, legal scholars, and thoughtful citizens willing to examine the historical record with intellectual honesty.

All ought to welcome that continuing debate.

Our constitutional tradition has always depended upon the willingness of one generation to revisit difficult questions through the disciplined study of text, history, and precedent. Such inquiry does not weaken constitutional government. It strengthens it. A written Constitution invites careful interpretation because it rests upon the enduring conviction that law possesses an objective meaning independent of the political passions of the moment.

The decision also reminds us of the proper role of Congress. If the majority has correctly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, and that is now the governing law, Congress ordinarily may not redefine constitutional citizenship through ordinary legislation. A statute cannot amend the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land, superior to every act of Congress.

The principal dissents, however, viewed the matter differently. Justice Thomas argued that the majority misunderstood the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause, while Justice Alito concluded that the Constitution leaves greater room for congressional judgment than the majority recognized. Under their reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would possess constitutional authority to distinguish among certain categories of foreign nationals because the Constitution itself would not compel the broader rule adopted by the majority. Thus, the disagreement is not merely about legislative authority; it is about the original meaning of the Constitution itself.

Whatever one’s view of that debate, the Constitution entrusts substantial authority over immigration and naturalization to the political branches. Congress establishes the Nation’s immigration laws by determining the rules governing admission, exclusion, visas, removal, and naturalization. The Executive Branch faithfully executes those laws by administering the immigration system, securing the Nation’s borders, and enforcing the statutes Congress has enacted. The Court’s decision concerns constitutional citizenship, not the broad constitutional authority of the political branches to regulate immigration.

Suppose, however, that the American people ultimately conclude that the majority has correctly or incorrectly interpreted the Citizenship Clause -- and therefore desire a different constitutional rule. What then? The Constitution itself provides the answer. Article V establishes a process by which the American people may amend their fundamental law. That process is intentionally demanding. It requires broad national consensus rather than temporary political majorities. The Framers wisely understood that constitutional stability is itself a safeguard of liberty. Fundamental changes to the Nation’s charter should occur only after careful deliberation and widespread agreement. Whether such an amendment would be prudent is a separate question. The point is more fundamental. Our constitutional system already contains a lawful mechanism for changing constitutional rules when the American people conclude that change is warranted. Judges should not amend the Constitution through interpretation.

This case also offers a timely reminder about the importance of civil discourse. Questions concerning immigration and citizenship evoke deeply held convictions. They touch upon national identity, public safety, economic opportunity, family, and the rule of law. For that very reason, they deserve our best constitutional reasoning rather than our loudest political rhetoric. Those who agree with the Court should resist the temptation to caricature those who dissent. Those, like me, who disagree should recognize that the majority’s opinion rests upon an engagement with constitutional text, history, and precedent. Constitutional disagreement need not become personal hostility.

A constitutional republic depends upon citizens who can reason together about first principles.

Ultimately, Trump v. Barbara teaches a lesson that reaches well beyond the Citizenship Clause. Every generation faces the temptation to read the Constitution through the lens of contemporary political controversies. Yet the enduring strength of our constitutional order lies in precisely the opposite approach. The Constitution must remain anchored in its text, informed by its history, illuminated by its structure, and disciplined by precedent. To sever constitutional interpretation from those anchors is to transform the Constitution from a rule of law into an instrument of political will.

The Framers gave us something better. They gave us a written Constitution so that its meaning would not fluctuate with every election, every shifting political coalition, or every passing cultural movement. They understood that liberty depends not only upon wise policies, but upon a stable constitutional order in which governmental power is exercised according to law rather than political expediency.

The debate over birthright citizenship will undoubtedly continue. So it should. Constitutional government thrives when thoughtful citizens engage difficult questions with seriousness, humility, and mutual respect. Whatever position one ultimately reaches on the scope of the Citizenship Clause, we should all remain committed to the enduring principle that has sustained our Republic since its founding. Each generation must receive the Constitution as it was adopted, interpret it according to its original public meaning, and faithfully preserve it for those yet to come.

Bibliography

Primary Constitutional and Statutory Sources

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.

Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

U.S. Constitution.

U.S. Const. art. II.

U.S. Const. art. V.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

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Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).

Howard, Jacob. Remarks Introducing the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).

Trumbull, Lyman. Remarks on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Meaning of “Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof.” Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).

Bingham, John. Selected Remarks on the Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).

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Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England.

Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.).

Kent, James. Commentaries on American Law.

Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.

Wilson, James. Collected Works of James Wilson.

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Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

Trump v. Barbara, ___ U.S. ___ (2026).

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).

Founding-Era Sources

The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison).

The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).

Originalist and Constitutional Scholarship

Barnett, Randy E. Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People.

Eastman, John C. Selected writings on the Citizenship Clause and Birthright Citizenship.

Green, Christopher R. Selected scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Citizenship Clause.

Harrison, John. Selected scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Lash, Kurt T. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship.

Paulsen, Michael Stokes. Selected writings on constitutional interpretation and originalism.

Ramsey, Michael D. Selected scholarship on original meaning and constitutional interpretation.

Scalia, Antonin. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law.

Whittington, Keith E. Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review.

Wurman, Ilan. Selected scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment and originalism.

Historical Scholarship

Benedict, Michael Les. Selected works on Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877.

Natural Law and Political Philosophy

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae.

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Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government.

Biblical Sources

The Holy Bible.

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Romans 13:1–7.